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I. Introduction 
When stolen artwork or antiquities are found in the United 
States, the government typically attempts to recover the property 
and restore it to its rightful owners under the asset forfeiture laws.  
If the government is able to bring a criminal case against the thief, 
smuggler, or other wrongdoer, it can recover the property under the 
criminal forfeiture laws as part of the defendant’s sentence.  But 
more typically, when there is no possibility of a criminal case 
because the wrongdoer is unknown, dead, a fugitive, or beyond the 
jurisdiction of the U.S. courts—or if the statute of limitations has 
run on the criminal offense—the government will still be able to 
recover the property under the civil forfeiture laws.  In either case, 
the government’s objective is to obtain clear title to the property so 
that it can then be restored to the person, entity, or country to whom 
it belongs. 
There are many examples of how the government has used asset 
forfeiture successfully to recover artwork and antiquities, including 
paintings stolen by the Nazis during the Holocaust, antiquities 
looted from archaeological sites in Europe and Asia, and items 
stolen or looted from museums in the developed world or in war 
zones.2  Nevertheless, an unintended consequence of one of the 
 
 2 See generally Karin Orenstein, Risking Criminal Liability in Cultural Property 
Transactions, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 527 (2020) (discussing the intersection of civil forfeiture, 
laws governing looted art, and American criminal law); Leila Amineddoleh, The 
Politicizing of Cultural Heritage, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 333 (2020) (discussing the 
 
2020 RECOVERING STOLEN ART AND ANTIQUITIES  395 
provisions of the forfeiture laws poses an obstacle to the effective 
use of this tool.3 
Concerned with the effect the forfeiture laws might have on so-
called “innocent owners” of forfeitable property, Congress included 
a provision in both the criminal and civil forfeiture statutes that 
protects the interest of “bona fide purchasers for value.”4  That is, if 
a third party shows that he acquired the property in exchange for 
something of value without reason to believe that the property was 
involved in a crime, the third party’s interest would trump the 
interest of the government in recovering it under the forfeiture 
laws.5  This provision was meant to protect a third-party who, for 
example, purchased a car without reason to know that it had been 
used by a drug dealer to distribute illegal drugs, or who sold 
merchandise to a racketeer without reason to know that he was 
being paid with racketeering proceeds.6 
But how does this protection apply when a third party has 
unwittingly paid for stolen artwork or a looted antiquity?  Does the 
 
repatriation of cultural heritage, some of which was seized through civil forfeiture actions). 
For a discussion of how the government has recovered looted archaeological artifacts, see 
generally Patty Gerstenblith, Provenience & Provenance Intersecting with International 
Law in the Market for Antiquities, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 457 (2020) (discussing the 
application of international laws and U.S. domestic laws on looted art to the context of 
plundered archaeological artifacts). This paper discusses several cases involving Nazi 
looted art; for an overview of Nazi plunder and individual attempts to recover looted 
artwork, see generally Donald S. Burris, Restoration of a Culture: A California Lawyer’s 
Lengthy Quest to Restitute Nazi-Looted Art, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 277 (2020) (providing an 
overview of Nazi looting and a chronology of American legal cases pertaining thereto); 
see also generally Marc Masurovsky, A Comparative Look at Nazi Plundered Art, Looted 
Antiquities, & Stolen Indigenous Objects, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 497 (2020) (discussing looted 
indigenous art and Nazi plunder, as well as the sociological implications thereof); Simon 
J. Frankel, The HEAR Act & Laches After Three Years, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 441 (2020) 
(discussing conflicting court decisions relating to Holocaust-era looted art, the 2016 
HEAR Act, and the equitable doctrine of latches). 
 3 See Stefan D. Cassella, The Uniform Innocent Owner Defense to Civil Asset 
Forfeiture, 89 KY. L.J. 653, 670–709 (2000) (describing the “innocent owner defense” as 
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(d). 
 4 See Cassella, The Uniform Innocent Owner, supra note 3, at 656–67 (describing 
the various concerns and legal developments that led to the proposal of 18 U.S.C. § 
983(d)). 
 5 Id. at 691–96. 
 6 Id. at 658.  See generally Cassella, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 
supra note 1 at § 12-6 (discussing the bona fide purchaser defense in civil cases under § 
983(d)(3)) and § 23-16 (same for criminal cases).   
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collector or museum that acquired the property take priority under 
the bona fide purchaser provision over the Government or over the 
rightful owner?  Asset forfeiture laws seemingly contain no 
exception to the bona fide purchaser rule to deal with this situation, 
and courts have accordingly struggled to explain why the 
government should be able to use the forfeiture laws to recover 
property for the benefit of victims in this situation.7 
This Article explains how the criminal and civil forfeiture laws 
work, provides a number of examples of their successful application 
to the recovery of cultural property, and then discusses the conflict 
between the government’s effort to recover property for the benefit 
of the rightful owner and the statutory right of third parties with 
competing interests to intervene and prevent the government from 
succeeding.  It concludes with a recommendation for a “legislative 
fix” that would limit the ability of third parties, other than the victim 
of the unlawful taking of the property, to block the government’s 
effort to recover the property under the forfeiture laws. 
II. Overview of Forfeiture Law 
A. What is the Government’s Interest? 
While private parties may bring their own actions to recover 
artwork and antiquities that have been wrongfully acquired, the 
government generally takes the lead in such cases, applying the 
tools and resources of law enforcement to recover property and, 
where appropriate, see that it is returned to its rightful owner.  There 
are many reasons for this: trafficking in valuable works of art—
stolen or legitimately acquired—is a favored method by which 
criminals engaged in other illegal activity launder their money or 
“park it” in a safe place,8 and the government has an obvious interest 
in suppressing such activity.  Even more importantly, terrorist 
organizations such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) use 
artifacts looted from archaeological sites and museums in war zones 
 
 7 But see 18 U.S.C. § 983(i)(2)(A) (exempting from CAFRA all forfeiture statutes 
related to U.S. customs law); United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 93–95 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(holding that CAFRA’s innocent owner defense does not apply to forfeitures under Title 
19 of the United States Code, which governs customs duties). 
 8 See Peter D. Hardy, Art and Money Laundering: Why the Global Art Market Needs 
Regulation, ARTLYST (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.artlyst.com/news/art-money-
laundering-global-art-market-needsregulation/ [https://perma.cc/HE3A-LGJ5]. 
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to raise money to finance their terrorist activity,9 and the 
government places the highest priority in taking whatever steps are 
necessary to make sure that that does not happen.  But by far the 
most common reason why the government intervenes in cases 
involving stolen works of art is to relieve victims and other private 
parties of the need to expend their own resources to recover the 
works because the government possesses both the resources and the 
legal tools to do so. 
In a criminal case involving the recovery of the money derived 
from a series of armed robberies, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit said the following regarding the use of the forfeiture laws to 
aid the victims of crime: “The government’s ability to collect on a 
[forfeiture] judgment often far surpasses that of an untutored or 
impecunious victim of crime . . . .  Realistically, a victim’s hope of 
getting paid may rest on the government’s superior ability to collect 
and liquidate a defendant’s assets.”10 
The same reasoning applies to the recovery of the stolen 
property itself: it is the government’s ability to seize stolen property 
under the forfeiture laws and preserve it while conflicting claims are 
sorted out in accordance with a structured and well-defined 
procedure, and to restore it to its rightful owner when the judicial 
process is complete, that makes it possible for many victims to 
recover property that was lost due to theft, fraud, or other 
wrongdoing. 
B. Criminal and Civil Forfeiture 
When recovering property under the forfeiture laws, the 
government has two options.  It can bring a criminal prosecution 
against the wrongdoer and, if it obtains a conviction, take title to the 
property as part of the wrongdoer’s sentence.11  Or it can name the 
 
 9 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Seeks Warrant to Seize 
Ring Trafficked by ISIS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/united-states-
seeks-warrant-seize-ring-trafficked-islamic-state-iraq-and-syria-isis 
[https://perma.cc/A3E9-YGFF]; Motion for Issuance of Warrant in rem, United States v. 
One Gold Ring with Carved Gemstone, Civ. No. 1:16-02442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2017). 
 10 United States v. Blackman, 746 F.3d 137, 143 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Kaley v. 
United States, 571 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (2014) (citing statistics on the Government’s use of 
forfeiture to compensate victims). 
 11 See Stefan D. Cassella, Criminal Forfeiture Procedure: An Analysis of 
Developments in the Law Regarding the Inclusion of a Forfeiture Judgment in the Sentence 
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property in a civil complaint, litigate the competing interests in the 
property, and obtain a forfeiture judgment conveying title to the 
property to the government when the process is complete.12  The 
former is called criminal forfeiture, and the latter is called civil, or 
non-conviction-based, forfeiture.  In either case, once the 
government obtains clear title to the property, it can restore it to its 
rightful owner.13 
1. Criminal forfeiture 
Because criminal forfeiture is part of the defendant’s sentence 
in a criminal case, there can be no forfeiture unless there is a 
criminal conviction for an offense for which forfeiture is authorized 
by statute.14  If the defendant is acquitted, if his sentence is 
overturned on appeal, or if he is convicted only of an offense 
unrelated to the property in question or for which Congress has not 
authorized forfeiture, the government cannot recover the property 
in the criminal case.15 
Most importantly, if no criminal case is possible—because the 
defendant is unknown, is a fugitive or is otherwise beyond the 
jurisdiction of the United States, is dead or incompetent to stand 
trial, or if the statute of limitations has run on the criminal offense 
 
Imposed in a Criminal Case, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 57 (2004) (“It is well-established that 
criminal forfeiture is part of the sentence imposed on a defendant in a criminal case.  There 
is no sentence, of course, unless the defendant is convicted of an offense.  Thus, it is 
fundamental that there can be no forfeiture order in a criminal case unless the defendant is 
convicted of an offense, and that the property to be forfeited must be connected in some 
way to the offense for which the defendant is convicted.”). 
 12 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2016). 
 13 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(i)(1) (2018) (authorizing the Attorney General to restore 
criminally forfeited property to victims); 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) (2018) (making the 
provisions of § 853 applicable to all criminal forfeiture cases); 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(6) 
(2018) (authorizing the Attorney General to restore civilly forfeited property to victims). 
 14 Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39 (1995) (“[C]riminal forfeiture is an aspect 
of punishment imposed following conviction of a substantive criminal offense.”). 
 15 See United States v. Lake, 472 F.3d 1247, 1250–51 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining 
that because the underlying fraud and money laundering convictions were reversed on 
appeal, forfeiture had to be vacated as well); United States v. Messino, 382 F.3d 704, 714 
(7th Cir. 2004) (holding that “[t]here must be a connection between [property subject to 
forfeiture and] . . . the underlying criminal activity on which the conviction rests”); United 
States v. Simon, 2010 WL 5359708, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 21, 2010) (holding that the Court 
cannot order forfeiture based on defendant’s conviction for fraud involving federal 
financial aid because Congress has not authorized forfeiture for that offense). 
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giving rise to the forfeiture—there will be no criminal conviction, 
and hence no possibility of recovering the property through criminal 
forfeiture.  Not surprisingly, these obstacles to criminal forfeiture 
are quite common in cases involving artwork and antiquities stolen 
in foreign countries and later found in the United States, often 
decades after the theft occurred. 
2. Civil forfeiture 
In contrast, a civil forfeiture action is an in rem action in which 
the property is named in the caption of the case, and persons with 
an interest in the property are invited to contest the forfeiture by 
filing claims.16  The idea is to bring everyone with a potential 
interest in the property into the courtroom at the same time, and to 
give each of them the opportunity to oppose the government’s 
attempt to establish that the property is subject to forfeiture.17  
Hence, in a civil forfeiture case, the government is the plaintiff, the 
property is the defendant, and third parties wishing to contest the 
forfeiture are called “claimants” who must intervene to protect 
whatever interests they may have in the property.18  If the 
government prevails, it will obtain clear title to the property, and 
can dispose of it as it sees fit.19 
To establish the forfeitability of the property, the government 
must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a crime was 
committed and that the property was involved in that crime.20  
Importantly, however, in contrast to a criminal forfeiture case, no 
criminal conviction is required to obtain a forfeiture order.21  Indeed, 
 
 16 See Types of Federal Forfeiture, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 1, 2017) 
https://www.justice.gov/afp/types-federal-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/VEX9-DMRP]. 
 17 Id. 
 18 See United States v. $8,440,190.00 in U.S. Currency, 719 F.3d 49, 57 (1st Cir. 
2013) (noting in a civil forfeiture case, the defendant is the property, and persons raising 
defenses to the forfeiture must establish standing to intervene); United States v. All Funds 
in Account Nos. 747.034/278 (Banco Espanol de Credito), 295 F.3d 23, 25 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (“Civil forfeiture actions are brought against property, not people.  The owner of the 
property may intervene to protect his interest.”). 
 19 See $8,440,190.00 in U.S. Currency, 719 F.3d at 57; All Funds in Account Nos. 
747.034/278, 295 F.3d at 25. 
 20 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2019).  But see 18 U.S.C. § 983(i) (exempting cases 
brought under the customs laws from the provision placing the burden of proof on the 
Government). 
 21 See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361–62 (1984) 
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the culpability of the property owner herself is not at issue;22 what 
matters is the nexus between the property and the crime.  Hence, 
civil forfeiture is the government’s vehicle of choice to recover 
stolen artwork and antiquities when it is not possible to bring a 
criminal case, but it is possible to prove that the property was 
derived from a criminal offense.23 
When the government elects the civil forfeiture option, the 
process works as follows.  The government seizes the property, 
generally with a judicial warrant,24 and files a complaint in federal 
court setting forth the legal basis for the forfeiture action.25  The 
government must then send notice of the forfeiture action to all 
potential claimants,26 who must respond by filing a verified claim 
 
(stating acquittal on gun violation under § 922 does not bar civil forfeiture under § 924(d)); 
Paret-Ruiz v. United States, 827 F.3d 167 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Civil forfeiture may occur 
without a finding of criminal liability;” reversal of defendant’s criminal conviction had no 
effect on the administrative forfeiture of personal property that was completed when 
defendant did not file a timely claim); United States v. $6,190.00 in U.S. Currency, 581 
F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding the district court’s jurisdiction over a civil forfeiture 
case does not depend on there being a related criminal case; it depends solely on the 
existence of a federal statute authorizing civil forfeiture); Von Hofe v. United States, 492 
F.3d 175, 190 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[C]riminal conviction of a claimant either in state or federal 
court is neither a necessary nor sufficient precondition to an in rem forfeiture.”). 
 22 See United States v. $734,578.82 in U.S. Currency, 286 F.3d 641, 657 (3d Cir. 
2002) (“Civil forfeiture is an in rem action against the property itself; the forfeiture is ‘not 
conditioned upon the culpability of the owner of the defendant property.’”); United States 
v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 668 n.16 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The most notable distinction between 
civil and criminal forfeiture is that civil forfeiture proceedings are brought against 
property, not against the property owner; the owner’s culpability is irrelevant in deciding 
whether property should be forfeited.”); United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (“Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding.  The property is the defendant in the 
case . . . . The innocence of the owner is irrelevant—it is enough that the property was 
involved in a violation to which forfeiture attaches.”). 
 23 See $734,578.82 in U.S. Currency, 286 F.3d at 657; Cherry, 330 F.3d at 668 n.16; 
Sandini, 816 F.2d at 872. 
 24 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) (2019) (requiring a judicial warrant to commence a 
forfeiture action unless an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement 
applies). 
 25 See FED. R. CIV. P. G(2), Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and Maritime Claims 
and Asset Forfeiture Actions [hereinafter “Supplemental Rules”].  There is also a 
procedure for forfeiting property administratively without commencing a judicial action, 
but that is rarely used in cultural property cases and is not discussed here.  For the 
procedures pertaining to administrative forfeitures, see 18 U.S.C. § 983(a) (2019). 
 26 See Supplemental Rule G(4), supra note 25. 
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within a fixed period of time if they wish to contest it.27  If no one 
files a claim, the government may move for a default judgment.28  
But if the action is contested, the claimant must first establish that 
he has a legal interest in the property sufficient to establish 
standing.29  If the claimant is successful, the burden shifts to the 
government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the property is subject to forfeiture.30  That is, it must establish that 
a crime for which forfeiture is authorized has occurred, and that the 
property was derived from or otherwise involved in that crime.31 
Importantly, in cases in which the forfeiture is based on 
violations of the customs laws,32 the procedure is slightly different.  
While the issues regarding the forfeitability of the property are the 
same—i.e., there must have been a criminal offense to which the 
property was connected—the government’s burden is only to show 
probable cause that the property is subject to forfeiture, at which 
point the burden shifts to the claimant to prove that it is not.33  This 
turns out to be a significant point in cases involving stolen artwork 
and antiquities, as we shall see.34 
3. The innocent owner defense 
As already noted, in civil forfeiture cases the focus is on the 
connection between the property and the offense, not on the 
culpability of the property owner.  In most civil forfeiture cases, 
 
 27 See Supplemental Rule G(5), supra note 25. 
 28 See, e.g., United States v. Bersa, Model: Thunder, 2015 WL 1503652 (E.D. Tex. 
Mar. 31, 2015) (granting default judgment based on finding that Government complied 
with Rule G(4), and no one filed a claim); United States v. One 2007 Toyota Camry, 2013 
WL 5074147 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013) (under the Local Rules, Government is entitled to 
a default judgment upon showing that it provided notice in accordance with Rule G(4), 
and that no one has filed a claim). 
 29 See United States v. $8,440,190.00 in U.S. Currency, 719 F.3d 49, 57 (1st Cir. 
2013) (“Standing is a threshold consideration in all cases, including civil forfeiture 
cases.”); United States v. Real Property Located at 5208 Los Franciscos Way, 385 F.3d 
1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that standing is a threshold issue on which the claimant 
bears the burden of proof in every civil forfeiture case). 
 30 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2019). 
 31 See Cassella, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1. 
 32 The term “the customs laws” generally refers to the Tariff Act of 1930, codified at 
19 U.S.C. §§ 1202–1683g (2018). 
 33 See id. 
 34 See United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 95 (2d Cir. 2011); 19 U.S.C. § 1615. 
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however, once the government establishes the forfeitability of the 
property, the claimant may assert what is commonly known as the 
innocent owner defense.35  Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(d), the 
defense allows a property owner to prevail in a forfeiture action if 
she owned the property before the crime giving rise to the forfeiture 
occurred and she was unaware that it was being used illegally,36 or 
if she acquired it thereafter as a bona fide purchaser for value and 
was without reason to know that it was subject to forfeiture at the 
time that she acquired it.37  Thus, the victim of the theft of a work 
of art will generally be able to recover it by asserting a claim under 
Section 983(d)(2) (because she owned it when the crime occurred), 
and a person who acquired it in an arm’s-length financial transaction 
without knowing of its illegal provenance will generally be able to 
recover it by asserting a claim under Section 983(d)(3) (because she 
was a bona fide purchaser for value).38 
Again, however, the law is different for cases arising under the 
customs laws.  In such cases, there is no innocent owner defense 
and thus no ability for the claimant to prevent the government from 
taking title to the property once its forfeitability is established.39  As 
will be discussed in Part V, infra, the availability of an innocent 
owner defense in most civil forfeiture cases, and the lack of such a 
defense in customs cases, is a critically important factor in cases 
involving stolen artwork and antiquities. 
4. Parallel civil and criminal proceedings 
Criminal and civil forfeiture are not mutually exclusive.  Indeed, 
the government may file a civil forfeiture action and then ask the 
court to stay it while a related criminal investigation or prosecution 
goes forward.40  Or it may file a civil forfeiture action after a related 
criminal prosecution has been completed.  In United States v. One 
 
 35 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2018). 
 36 See § 983(d)(2). 
 37 See § 983(d)(3).  There is a statutory counterpart to the innocent owner defense 
that applies in criminal forfeiture cases.  See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6). 
 38 See § 983(d)(2)–(3). 
 39 See Davis, 648 F.3d at 93–95 (stating that there is no innocent owner defense in 
19 U.S.C. § 1595(a) and that 18 U.S.C § 983(d) does not apply because of the customs 
carve-out in § 983(i)). 
 40 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(g) (2018). 
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Ancient Mosaic,41 the government did the former when it filed a 
civil forfeiture action against a 2,000-year-old mosaic discovered 
during the search of the residence of a person under investigation 
for smuggling items looted from war zones in the Middle East, and 
then moved to stay the action pending the conclusion of the criminal 
case.42  And in United States v. Assorted Artifacts,43 the government 
did the latter when, after obtaining a conviction against a person 
who had smuggled various antiquities into the United States from 
Pakistan, it filed a civil forfeiture action to obtain clear title to the 
property.44 
For the reasons suggested earlier, however, the vast majority of 
forfeiture cases involving stolen artwork are filed exclusively as 
civil forfeiture cases.  Accordingly, the examples given throughout 
this article consist almost entirely of civil forfeiture cases. 
III. Theories of Forfeiture 
To bring a forfeiture action, the government must have a 
statutory basis for doing so.45  There is no common law of forfeiture 
nor a blanket provision authorizing forfeiture in all cases where a 
crime has occurred.46  Thus, in every case, the government must cite 
the statute giving rise to the forfeiture and conform its proof to the 
requirements of that statute.47 
To recover stolen artwork and antiquities, the government has a 
variety of statutory options.  Some, however, are quite limited in 
scope and apply in only narrow circumstances. 
A. The Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA) 
If the stolen artwork or antiquity fits the definition of 
“ethological material” important to the cultural heritage of a country 
 
 41 Complaint, United States v. One Ancient Mosaic, No. 2:18-cv-04420 (C.D. Cal. 
May 23, 2018). 
 42 Status of Report Re: Stay, United States v. One Ancient Mosaic, No. 2:18-cv-
04420 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2019). 
 43 Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendations, United States v. Assorted 
Artifacts, 2017 WL 1205086 (E.D. Va. Feb. 21, 2017). 
 44 Id. at *4 (granting the Government’s motion for a default judgment). 
 45 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 46 See United States v. Grundy, 7 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1806). 
 47 See, e.g., Davis, 648 F.3d at 87. 
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that is a party to the UNESCO Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property—commonly known as the 
“Convention on Cultural Property”—the property may be recovered 
in a forfeiture action if certain criteria are satisfied.48 
Congress implemented the Convention by enacting 19 U.S.C. § 
2606, et seq. (the Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA)), 
which makes it unlawful to import “ethnological material” (defined 
in great detail in the regulations) into the United States without the 
permission of the country of origin.49  The forfeiture provision, 19 
U.S.C. § 2609, authorizes the forfeiture of any ethnological material 
imported into the United States in violation of Section 2606.50  In 
such cases, it is not necessary to show that the item was stolen; it is 
only necessary to show that it is covered by the regulations and 
various agreements designating it as ethnological material and that 
it was imported without the permission of the country of origin.51 
1. Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas 
In United States v. Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on 
Canvas,52 the government used the CPIA to file a civil forfeiture 
action to recover two oil paintings that had been stolen from 
churches in Peru or Bolivia and imported to the United States for 
sale.53  The facts were straightforward.  A man named Ortiz brought 
two oil paintings into National Airport in Washington from Bolivia: 
one was called the Doble Trinidad and the other was San Antonio 
De Padua and Santa Rosa De Lima.54  The paintings were rolled up 
in cardboard tubes and had been cut from their frames with a razor.55 
No one could link the paintings to a particular theft from a 
 
 48 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231. 
 49 See 19 U.S.C. § 2606 (2018). 
 50 See 19 U.S.C. § 2609(a) (2018). 
 51 United States v. Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting of the Doble 
Trinidad, 597 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621 (E.D. Va. 2009) (describing the regulations, 
memoranda of understanding, and other agreements defining and designating ethnological 
material). 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id. 
 54 Id. at 619. 
 55 Id. 
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particular church—indeed, it wasn’t clear if they were from Peru or 
from Bolivia—and there was no proof that Ortiz was involved in 
the theft.  But art experts provided affidavits saying that they were 
a product of the Cuzco School during the 17th and 18th Centuries in 
the Andean region around Cuzco, Peru (straddling the modern-day 
border between Peru and Bolivia).56 
The paintings fit the definition of “ethnological material” in that 
they were “the product of a tribal or nonindustrial society,” “used 
for religious evangelism,” and thus “important to the cultural 
heritage” of the people of that region, and neither Peru nor Bolivia 
had given permission for the paintings to be exported out of either 
country.57  Thus, even though there was no criminal investigation or 
prosecution—indeed, there was no identifiable victim of the theft 
and the forfeiture was not based on the paintings’ having been 
stolen—there were sufficient grounds to recover the paintings 
through civil forfeiture.58 
While it was uncertain whether the paintings came from Peru or 
from Bolivia, for purposes of the government’s motion for summary 
judgment in the civil forfeiture case, it did not matter.59  All that the 
government had to do was show that the paintings fit the definition 
of ethnological material and that they came from some country that 
was a party to the Convention and that had not given permission for 
them to be exported.60  The court granted summary judgment for the 
government and left it to the Attorney General to decide how (and 
to whom) to repatriate the paintings.61 
 
 56 Id. at 620. 
 57 “In sum, the CPIA makes it illegal to import into the United States a (1) Colonial-
era painting (2) produced in Peru (3) by indigenous people, (4) used for religious 
evangelism among those people, and (5) that is important to the cultural heritage of those 
people (6) without documentation from Peru either certifying that the exportation from 
Peru (whether or not that export was directly to the United States) did not violate Peruvian 
law.”  United States v. Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting of the Doble 
Trinidad, 597 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621–22 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 58 See generally id. 
 59 Id. at 625 (“Claimant’s assertions regarding the origin of the Defendant paintings 
are unsupported and inadequate to defeat summary judgment.”). 
 60 The burden of proof under the CPIA is somewhat unique.  The Government has 
the initial burden of showing that the CPIA applies because the property has been 
designated as ethnological material.  The burden then shifts to the claimant to prove that 
the property is not subject to forfeiture under the terms of the statute.  Id. at 623. 
 61 See id. at 625–26. 
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2. Twenty-Nine Pre-Columbian Artifacts 
In a similar case, United States v. Twenty-Nine Pre-Columbian 
and Colonial Artifacts from Peru,62 Customs and Border Patrol 
agents in Miami intercepted a Peruvian citizen arriving on a flight 
from Peru with thirty-two objects that appeared to be ancient 
artifacts in his luggage.63  When the Peruvian government advised 
the traveler that the artifacts “constituted part of the Peruvian 
cultural heritage” and that Peru had not authorized their exportation, 
the government filed a civil forfeiture action under the CPIA and 
other statutes to recover the property.64 
The claimant—the traveler from whom the objects were 
seized—contested the forfeiture and raised a series of procedural 
objections including the denial of his right to due process and the 
failure of the government to establish that the objects fit the 
definition of “ethnological materials,” all of which were 
unsuccessful.65  The government responded by challenging the 
claimant’s standing to contest the forfeiture,66 and his refusal to 
appear for a deposition.67  In the end, the claimant’s refusal to submit 
to a deposition led the court to dismiss his claim and to enter a 
judgment of forfeiture for the government as to all of the seized 
artifacts.68 
 
 62 United States v. Twenty-Nine Pre-Columbian and Colonial Artifacts from Peru, 
2014 WL 12861854 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2014). 
 63 Id. at *1. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at *2–5 (addressing and refuting each of the Claimant’s contentions in favor of 
the Government). 
 66 Twenty-Nine Pre-Columbian and Colonial Artifacts from Peru, 2014 WL 
12861856, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2014) (denying the Government’s motion for summary 
judgment on the basis of claimant’s lack of standing and granting the Government’s 
motion to strike a paragraph of claimant’s answer to its second complaint). 
 67 United States v. Twenty-Nine Pre-Columbian and Colonial Artifacts from Peru, 
2015 WL 1518033, at *2–5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2015) (directing claimant to show cause why 
his claim should not be dismissed for refusal to submit to a deposition). 
 68 United States v. Twenty-Nine Pre-Columbian and Colonial Artifacts from Peru, 
No. 1:13-cv-21697-LENARD (Doc. 269) (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2015) (granting the 
Government’s motion for final forfeiture and ordering forfeiture of the artifacts thereto), 
aff’d per curiam, 695 F. App’x 461 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming “[t]he district court’s entry 
of final judgment of forfeiture in the consolidated forfeiture action”). 
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3. Ancient Coin Collector’s Guild 
A third CPIA case, Ancient Coin Collector’s Guild v. Customs 
and Border Protection,69 involved ancient Cypriot and Chinese 
coins that were imported into the United States by coin collectors.70  
Customs agents seized the coins on the grounds that they were being 
imported in violation of the CPIA, and the government filed a civil 
forfeiture action against them.71 
The claimant, the Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, opposed the 
seizure on a number of statutory and constitutional grounds.72  The 
gravamen of the Guild’s objection was that the CPIA limited the 
rights of its members to collect ancient coins, but the court rejected 
each of its challenges to the CPIA on the merits.73  Among other 
things, the court held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the 
State Department’s procedure for including the coins on the list of 
archaeological materials covered by the CPIA, that the State 
Department did not exceed its statutory authority to issue 
regulations under the CPIA, and that banning the importation of the 
coins did not violate the Guild’s rights under the First Amendment.74 
B. Terrorism Cases 
Another forfeiture statute applicable to a narrow set of 
circumstances, and hence one that is rarely used, is 18 U.S.C. § 
981(a)(1)(G), which authorizes the forfeiture of “all assets, foreign 
or domestic, of any individual, entity, or organization engaged in 
planning or perpetrating” an act of terrorism against the United 
States or against a foreign government.75  While the scope of the 
statute is broad—”all assets” literally means “all assets” whether 
 
 69 Ancient Coin Collector’s Guild v. U.S. Customs & Border Protection, 698 F.3d 
171, 185 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 70 Id. at 171. 
 71 Id. at 177–78. 
 72 Id. at 178–79. 
 73 Id. at 178–79, 184–85 (affirming the district court’s judgment as a “faithfully 
interpret[ing] the CPIA”). 
 74 Id. at 184–85; see also Ancient Coin Collector’s Guild v. U.S. Customs & Border 
Protection, 801 F. Supp. 2d 383, 417–18 (D. Md. 2011) (discussing the application of the 
procedures in the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA) to forfeitures brought under 
the Customs laws, and holding that they do not apply to forfeitures under the CPIA). 
 75 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G)(i) (2012); § 981(a)(1)(G)(iv). 
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they were used to commit the terrorist offense or not—it applies 
only when the government has proof that that the owner of the assets 
is a terrorist or terrorist organization.76 
One application of this statute already mentioned was United 
States v. One Gold Ring With Carved Gemstone,77 in which the U.S. 
Attorney for the District of Columbia filed an action against several 
coins, rings, and other jewelry items that were allegedly looted or 
taken through extortion from archaeological sites in Syria and used 
to finance terrorist activities perpetrated by ISIS.78  Among other 
things, the items included Roman coins from the first century B.C. 
and the second century A.D., a Neo-Assyrian stone carving from the 
ninth century B.C., and gold jewelry of Roman origin from the third 
century A.D.79  When no one filed a claim contesting the forfeiture, 
the court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment.80 
C. Failure to Declare Imported Goods 
A simple way for the government to recover artwork and other 
cultural property is to show that it was brought into the United States 
by a traveler who failed to declare it on a customs form upon 
arrival.81  While the statute only applies when the property was in 
the personal possession of the international traveler, it is useful 
when it applies.82 
In United States v. Various Ukranian [sic] Artifacts,83 a flight 
attendant arrived at JFK Airport in New York on a flight from 
Ukraine with 123 religious artifacts in her luggage, none of which 
 
 76 See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (defining the crime of terrorism under federal law). 
 77 Amended Complaint, United States v. One Gold Ring with Carved Gemstone, No. 
1:16-02442-TFH (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2017). 
 78 Id. at 2. 
 79 Id. at 10–19. 
 80 United States v. One Gold Ring with Carved Gemstone, 2019 WL 5853493 
(D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2019) (entering default judgment under § 981(a)(1)(G) against foreign 
assets of terrorist organization ISIS). 
 81 19 U.S.C. §§ 1485, 1497 (2012); United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 
F.3d 131, 135–36 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 82 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1485, 1497 (2012); An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d at 135–
36. 
 83 United States of America v. Various Ukranian [sic] Artifacts, 1997 WL 793093 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1997). 
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were declared on her customs declaration form.84  Accordingly, the 
government commenced a civil forfeiture action against the items, 
citing 19 U.S.C. § 1497, a statute that makes such undeclared 
merchandise subject to forfeiture.85 
A claim to the property was filed by Stuart Freeman, who 
alleged that he purchased the items from a dealer who was 
responsible for arranging the shipping from Ukraine to New York.  
Because it was the dealer, not he, who was responsible for filing the 
Customs form, Freeman said, he should be protected from the 
forfeiture as an innocent owner.86  The court held, however, that 
there is no innocent owner defense to a forfeiture under Section 
1497, and thus entered summary judgment for the government 
based solely on the shipper and flight attendant’s failure to declare 
the property upon arrival in the United States.87  As we will see, the 
absence of an innocent owner defense in forfeiture cases brought 
under customs laws is a recurring theme in cultural property cases. 
D. False Customs Declaration 
A similar device for recovering artwork and antiquities is 18 
U.S.C. § 545, a statute that makes it an offense to smuggle or 
“clandestinely introduce” merchandise into the United States “with 
the intent to defraud.”  In addition to providing for criminal 
penalties, the statute authorizes the forfeiture of the smuggled 
merchandise.88 
One example already mentioned was United States v. Assorted 
Artifacts,89 in which the government filed a civil forfeiture action 
under Section 545 to recover numerous items after the smuggler, 
Ijaz Khan, was convicted in a related case of a criminal violation of 
the same statute.90  The complaint alleged that Khan shipped a load 
of artifacts including pottery items, arrowheads, ancient and 
medieval coins, and jewelry—with an aggregate value of more than 
 
 84 Id. at *1. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at *3. 
 88 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2012). 
 89 United States of America v. Assorted Artifacts, 2017 WL 1205086 (E.D. Va. Feb. 
21, 2017). 
 90 Id. at *2. 
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$10,000—from Pakistan to the United States accompanied by “a 
false and fraudulent way bill and goods declaration that described 
the artifacts as decoration pieces,” and that he subsequently sold the 
items on eBay.91  Because Khan had already been convicted and no 
other person filed a claim to the property—the collector who 
purchased the items on eBay having voluntarily turned them over to 
the government—the court entered a default judgment.92 
A better-known example of a forfeiture under Section 545 is 
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold,93 in which a New York 
art dealer purchased an ancient Sicilian “Phiale”—a platter of 
gold—from a Swiss art dealer for approximately $1.2 million on 
behalf of an American client.94  Under an Italian “patrimony” law, 
any archaeological item of Italian origin is presumed to belong to 
the Italian government unless its possessor can show private 
ownership prior to 1902.95  That meant that the Phiale was Italian 
government property, but the art dealer, who knew that the Phiale 
was of Italian/Sicilian origin, attempted to circumvent the Italian 
law by faxing a commercial invoice to a customs broker in New 
York falsely indicating that the Phiale’s country of origin was 
Switzerland and falsely stating its value as $250,000.96  The art 
dealer thereafter transported the Phiale to New York, and the 
customs broker used the false invoice to clear the Phiale through 
customs and deliver it to the client.97 
When the scheme was discovered, the U.S. Attorney, acting at 
the request of the Italian government, filed a civil forfeiture action 
against the Phiale under two alternative theories: (1) that the 
property was imported in violation of Section 545 because the false 
statements made in the invoice concerning the country of origin and 
the value of the property were material misstatements in violation 
of Section 542; and (2) that the property was imported “contrary to 
law” within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1595a because it constituted 
 
 91 Indictment at 22–25, United States v. Khan, No. 1:16-cr-00130 (E.D. Va. May 26, 
2016). 
 92 Assorted Artifacts, 2017 WL 1205086, at *3–4. 
 93 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 138–39 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 94 Id. at 133. 
 95 Id. at 134. 
 96 Id. at 133–34. 
 97 Id. 
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stolen property under Italian law and thus could not be imported into 
the United States under the National Stolen Property Act (18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2314–15).98 
The owner of the Phiale—the client of the New York art 
dealer—filed a claim, but the district court granted summary 
judgment for the government on both theories.99  The Second Circuit 
affirmed the forfeiture under Section 545 without reaching the 
alternative theory under Section 1595a.100 
The first issue was whether the false statement regarding the 
country of origin was material, and the panel held that it was.101  The 
claimant then argued that he was entitled to an innocent owner 
defense when a forfeiture is based on Section 545, but the panel held 
that he was not.102 
At the time the case was decided in 1999, the ruling as to the 
innocent owner defense was correct: there was no uniform innocent 
owner defense to forfeitures under Title 18 of the U.S. Code until 
2000 when Congress enacted Section 983(d) as part of the Civil 
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA).  As mentioned in Part II.B, 
supra, when CAFRA took effect the next year, it made the innocent 
owner defense available in all cases except customs cases brought 
under the customs laws codified in Title 19.  Section 545 is a 
customs statute, but it is in Title 18.103 
As will be discussed in Part V, infra, if this case were brought 
today under Section 545, the owner of the property would be 
entitled to assert an innocent owner defense, which seriously limits 
the ability of the government to use the statute to recover artwork 
and antiquities and return them to their rightful owners or to their 
country of origin.  Accordingly, given the availability of 
alternatives, except in cases like Ancient Artifacts where the 
forfeiture is uncontested, the government is reluctant to seek the 
forfeiture of illegally imported property under Section 545 today. 
 
 
 98 An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d at 134. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 134. 
 101 Id. at 135–38. 
 102 Id. at 138–39. 
 103 18 U.S.C. § 545. 
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E. Forfeiture Under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) and the National 
Stolen Property Act 
To recover property in other circumstances, the government 
needs to rely on statutes that are broader in scope.104  The statutes of 
choice in cases involving stolen artwork and antiquities are usually 
19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c), which provides for the forfeiture of any 
merchandise that is introduced into the United States “contrary to 
law,” and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), which authorizes the forfeiture 
of the proceeds of a long list of crimes, including the National Stolen 
Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–15.105  Given their prevalence in 
forfeiture cases brought to recover stolen artwork, it is worth taking 
a moment to discuss the requirements of both statutes. 
Section 1595a(c)(1)(A) provides as follows: “Merchandise 
which is introduced . . . into the United States contrary to law shall 
be . . . seized and forfeited if it – (A) is stolen, smuggled, or 
clandestinely imported or introduced.”106  As courts have held, the 
government can obtain forfeiture under this provision if it 
establishes two separate, if somewhat overlapping, elements: (1) 
that the property was introduced into the United States “contrary to 
law,” and (2) that it was “stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely 
imported or introduced.”107 
There are several ways to show that merchandise was 
introduced “contrary to law.”  One of the simplest is to show that 
when it was imported, the importer provided false information on 
the required customs forms or related documents in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 542.108  For example, in United States v. The Painting 
Known as Hannibal, the government based its forfeiture action 
under Section 1595a(c), not on any allegation that the painting was 
stolen, but based on the importer’s having falsely claimed, at the 
 
 104 See 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c); 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). 
 105 See § 1595a(c); see also § 981(a)(1)(C). 
 106 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A). 
 107 See United States v. Broadening-Info Enters. (Hannibal II), 462 F. App’x 93, 96 
(2d Cir. 2012) (following United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2011)); United 
States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, 2013 WL 1290515, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013). 
 108 18 U.S.C. § 542 (making it an offense to introduce merchandise “by means of any 
fraudulent or false invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false 
statement . . . .”). 
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time of the importation, that the painting was valued at only $100, 
instead of the $8 million at which it had been appraised.109 
In such cases, the government still must satisfy the second 
element—i.e., that the painting was “stolen, smuggled, or 
clandestinely imported or introduced,” but as the court held in 
Hannibal, the intentionally and materially false statements on the 
importation documents satisfied the “smuggled or clandestinely 
imported or introduced” requirement.110 
If the government chooses to allege that the property was 
imported “contrary to law” because it was stolen, it generally will 
pair the Section 1595a(c) allegation with an allegation that the 
property was imported in violation of the National Stolen Property 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314–15.111  In such cases, proof that the painting 
was stolen will simultaneously satisfy both the “contrary to law” 
requirement and the requirement that it was “stolen, smuggled, or 
clandestinely imported or introduced.”112  Importantly, however, if 
the government chooses to go this route, it must prove not only that 
the painting was stolen at the time it was imported, but also that the 
person who imported it knew that it was stolen at the time that she 
did so.113  As we will see, this has proven to be problematic in some 
cases. 
In the case of property involved in a domestic theft, the 
government will likely bring its civil forfeiture action under 18 
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), which authorizes the forfeiture of all 
“proceeds” of any violation of a long list of state, federal, and 
foreign crimes, including the National Stolen Property Act.114  Thus, 
when a painting entitled “Othello and Desdemona” was stolen from 
 
 109 United States v. Painting Known as Hannibal (Hannibal I), 2010 WL 2102484, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2010). 
 110 United States v. Painting Known as Hannibal (Hannibal III), 2013 WL 1890220, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2013).  The Hannibal case is discussed in more detail in Part V, 
infra. 
 111 See, e.g., United States v. Portrait of Wally (Wally IV), 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 250 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 112 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, 2013 WL 1290515, at *6 (citing 
Davis, 648 F.3d at 90). 
 113 Wally IV, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 269. 
 114 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem at 2, United States v. One Oil Painting 
Entitled Othello and Desdemona by Marc Chagall, No. 1:18-cv-841 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 
2018). 
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a residence in New York in 1988, and turned up nearly thirty years 
later at a gallery in Washington, D.C., the government filed its 
forfeiture action under Section 981(a)(1)(C), alleging that the 
painting was the proceeds of interstate transportation of stolen 
property in violation of Sections 2314 and 2315.115  In such a case, 
the government need only prove that the property was stolen and 
that the person who transported it in interstate commerce knew it 
was stolen at the time he transported it. 
While the forfeiture theories are similar, there is a critical 
difference between forfeitures under Section 1595a(c) and 
forfeitures under Section 981(a)(1)(C).  As mentioned above, the 
former is part of the customs laws and thus is not covered by the 
innocent owner defense that was enacted as part of CAFRA in 
2000.116  The latter, however, is definitely covered by the innocent 
owner defense.  As we will see in Part V, this distinction has 
enormous consequences. 
IV. Case Examples 
The following examples of actions to recover stolen artwork 
pursuant to Section 1595a(c) and/or Section 981(a)(1)(C) are 
grouped by how the litigation unfolded and the issues that were 
raised.  The cases involving the most problematic issue—the 
innocent owner defense—are reserved until Part V. 
A. The Uncontested Cases 
1. “Untitled” by Robert Motherwell 
Sometimes things go so well for the government that it is not 
necessary to file a forfeiture action at all.  Such was the case 
involving an untitled painting by the twentieth century American 
artist, Robert Motherwell, which had been missing for forty years.117  
In 2017, the son of a deceased worker for a moving company that 
 
 115 Id. at 2–3. 
 116 United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that CAFRA 
expressly excludes forfeitures brought under Title 19 from the innocent owner provision, 
and refusing to find such a defense implicit in the statute). 
 117 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI Announce 
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had been in charge of relocating Motherwell’s artwork in the 1960s 
and 1970s, notified the foundation that held title to Motherwell’s 
collection that a painting had been found among his father’s 
possessions.118  When contacted by the FBI, the son relinquished the 
painting to the FBI’s Art Crime Team, which identified it as a 
Motherwell painting that had been missing since at least 1978.119  
The FBI turned it over to the foundation, thereby restoring it to its 
rightful owner without having to commence any formal forfeiture 
action.120 
Most cases, however, involve the filing of a formal civil 
forfeiture complaint and the sending of notice of the forfeiture 
action to persons who appear to have an interest in the property.121  
Then, if the person who was in possession of the artwork when it 
was discovered does not contest its forfeiture, the government, upon 
the entry of a forfeiture judgment, can restore the property to its 
rightful owner.  There are many recent examples of this. 
2. A Scholar Sharpening His Quill 
During the Second World War, a seventeenth century painting 
by Salomon Koninck entitled “A Scholar Sharpening His Quill” 
was stolen by the Nazis from a collection of Dutch and Flemish 
paintings (known as the Schloss Collection) held by a Jewish family 
in France.122  Owing to the meticulous records the Nazis kept of their 
trove of looted artwork, an inventory of paintings that disappeared 
during the 1940s in Europe has been available to scholars, art 
historians, and law enforcement for decades.123  The Koninck 
painting was included in that inventory; indeed, a photograph of the 
painting was included in a gold-tooled, leather-bound album 
presented to Adolf Hitler, recording the works taken from the 
 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 See Supplemental Rule G(2), supra note 25; Supplemental Rule G(4), supra note 
25. 
 122 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture at 2, United States v. Painting Known as A 
Scholar Sharpening His Quill by the Artist Salomon Koninck, No. 1:18-cv-09611 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018). 
 123 Id. at 4–5. 
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Schloss Collection.124 
In November 2017, an art dealer in Chile entered into an 
agreement with Christie’s auction house in New York to sell the 
painting.125  When it arrived in New York, however, Christies’ 
employees accessed the inventory of paintings stolen during the 
Holocaust and identified the Koninck painting as one missing from 
the Schloss Collection.126  Informed of these events, the Chilean art 
dealer advised the government that her father had purchased the 
painting in Munich, Germany in 1952, and that she had inherited it 
upon his death in 1987.127 
The government filed a civil forfeiture action against the 
painting pursuant to Sections 1595a(c) and 981(a)(1)(C), alleging 
that it was a stolen work of art that had been introduced into the 
United States contrary to law, and that it was the proceeds of a 
violation of the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314.128  
The art dealer voluntarily agreed to relinquish all rights to the 
painting, the court entered a stipulated order of forfeiture, and the 
government agreed to return the paint to the Schloss heirs.129  Other 
than the filing of the complaint, there was no litigation of the 
forfeiture issues. 
3. An Amorous Couple 
The recovery of a painting called An Amorous Couple by Pierre 
Louis Goudreaux involves a similar tale.  The painting was looted 
by German troops from the Khanenko Museum in Ukraine in 1943 
 
 124 Id. at 5–6. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 7. 
 127 Id. at 8; Stipulation and Order (Doc. 7) at 2, United States v. Painting Known as 
A Scholar Sharpening His Quill by the Artist Salomon Koninck, No. 1:18-cv-09611 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018). 
 128 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture at 9–10, Painting Known as A Scholar 
Sharpening His Quill by the Artist Salomon Koninck, No. 1:18-cv-09611 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
19, 2018). 
 129 See Stipulation and Order, supra note 127, at 3; Judgment of Forfeiture at 2, 
Painting Known as A Scholar Sharpening His Quill by the Artist Salomon Koninck No. 
1:18-cv-09611 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2019); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Return to its Rightful Owners of Old Master Painting 
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and disappeared until 2013 when it was posted for sale on the 
official website of the Doyle Auction House in New York.130  The 
FBI commenced an investigation which culminated in the filing of 
a civil forfeiture complaint against the painting pursuant to Sections 
1595a(c) and 981(a)(1)(C) in 2019.131 
When no one, including the person who had consigned the 
painting to the auction house, filed a claim contesting the forfeiture, 
the court entered a default judgment, forfeiting the painting to the 
United States so that it could be returned to the museum in 
Ukraine.132 
4. Ivan the Terrible 
One other World War II-era theft involved a painting of Ivan the 
Terrible that was stolen from another Ukrainian museum during the 
war.  In 1987, a U.S. citizen purchased a home in Connecticut and 
found that a painting of Ivan the Terrible, measuring 7.5 feet by 8.5 
feet, had been conveyed with the house (apparently the prior owner 
did not want it).133  Investigation revealed that the prior owner, in 
turn, had obtained title to the painting in 1962 when he purchased 
the same house from a former Swiss army officer who had served 
in the Second World War and emigrated to the United States in 
1946.134 
In 2017, the owners of the painting transported it to Washington, 
D.C. with the intent to sell it through an auction house.135  When a 
 
 130 See Verified Civil Complaint for Forfeiture at 3, United States v. Painting 
Formerly Entitled A Family Portrait and Currently Entitled An Amorous Couple Or 
Alternatively A Loving Glance by The Artist Pierre Louis Goudreaux, No. 1:19-cv-02517 
(S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2019). 
 131 See id. at 1–2; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney 




 132 See Judgment of Forfeiture at 2–4, Painting Formerly Entitled A Family Portrait 
and Currently Entitled An Amorous Couple Or Alternatively A Loving Glance by The 
Artist Pierre Louis Goudreaux, No. 1:19-cv-02517. 
 133 See Verified Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem at 2–3, United States v. One Painting 
Entitled Secret Departure of Ivan the Terrible Before the Oprichina, No. 1:18-cv-03015 
(D.D.C. June 12, 2019). 
 134 See id. 
 135 Id. at 3. 
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photograph of the painting appeared in the auction house’s 
catalogue, however, the Ukrainian museum contacted the 
consignee, which halted the sale.136 
Ultimately, the government filed a civil forfeiture action against 
the painting, based once again on Sections 1595a(c) and 
981(a)(1)(C), and the Ukrainian museum filed the only claim.137  
The owners of the painting agreed to waive any right they had to the 
painting, which allowed the museum and the government to enter 
into a Consent Order of Forfeiture forfeiting the painting to the 
United States, which agreed to return it to the museum as the rightful 
owner.138 
5. Five Architectural Drawings 
A case involving a more recent theft involved five ink and 
watercolor drawings of a Polish synagogue that were stolen from 
the Polish State Archives by an unknown thief in 1999.139  Nearly 
twenty years later, Polish law enforcement authorities contacted 
their counterparts in the United States, seeking assistance in 
recovering the drawings, which turned out to have been purchased 
by two American collectors from Sotheby’s auction house in 
2008.140 
The collectors agreed to relinquish any claim to the drawings, 
and the court—apparently without requiring the government to file 
a formal civil forfeiture complaint—entered a Stipulation and Order 
directing the government to return the drawings to the Polish State 
 
 136 Id. at 3–4. 
 137 See Verified Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem at 1–2, United States v. One Painting 
Entitled Secret Departure of Ivan the Terrible Before the Oprichina, No. 1:18-cv-03015 
(D.D.C. June 12, 2019); see also Notice of Verified Claim of Claimant Dnipropetrovsk 
Art Museum, United States v. One Painting Entitled Secret Departure of Ivan the Terrible 
Before the Oprichina, No. 1:18-cv-03015 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 138 See Consent Order of Forfeiture at 1–2, United States v. One Painting Entitled 
Secret Departure of Ivan the Terrible Before the Oprichina, No. 1:18-cv-03015 (D.D.C. 
2019).  See also Barbara Leonard, US Sues for Forfeiture of ‘Ivan the Terrible’ Painting, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/us-sues-for-
forfeiture-of-ivan-the-terrible-painting/ [https://perma.cc/PT3G-GLTM]. 
 139 See Stipulation and Order at 1–2, In re Five Architectural Drawings of the Stara 
Synagogue on Wolborska St. in Lodz (Poland) by Adolf Zeligson, No. 1:19-mc-00297 
(S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2019). 
 140 See id. 
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Archive.141  Notably, the Stipulation and Order allowed the 
collectors to reserve the right to assert a claim against Sotheby’s to 
recover the money that they paid for the drawings.142 
6. Othello and Desdemona 
Finally, there is the case of Othello and Desdemona, a painting 
by Marc Chagall, that was stolen from a private residence in New 
York City in 1988.  When someone attempted to consign the 
painting to an art gallery in Washington, D.C. in 2017, the gallery 
owner refused to accept it and counseled the would-be consignor to 
contact the FBI.143  The consignor did so, and the FBI established 
that the painting was indeed the one that was stolen in New York 
nearly thirty years before.144 
Because this case, unlike those mentioned previously, involved 
a purely domestic violation of criminal law, the government filed its 
civil forfeiture complaint solely under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), 
alleging that it was the proceeds of a domestic violation of the 
National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–15.145  The estate 
of the victim of the theft filed a claim contesting the forfeiture, 
asserting that it was the rightful owner of the property.146  When no 
one else filed a claim, however, the government and the estate filed 
a joint motion asking the court to enter a judgment of forfeiture.147  
The court did so, directing the government to surrender the painting 
to the estate once the forfeiture order was final.148 
 
 141 Id. at 3. 
 142 Id. See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney 
Announces Return to Polish Government of Stolen Architectural Drawings of Historic 
Synagogue (June 21, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-
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[https://perma.cc/4MQQ-ET9J]. 
 143 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem at 1, 3–4, United States v. One Oil 
Painting Entitled Othello and Desdemona by Marc Chagall, No. 1:18-cv-00841 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 29, 2018). 
 144 See id. at 6. 
 145 See id. 
 146 See id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See Spencer S. Hsu, 30 Years After Theft, FBI Recovers Chagall Painting Stolen 
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B. Contested Cases 
1. Claims that settle 
Often, of course, things do not go so smoothly.  One or more 
parties may contest the government’s forfeiture action, raising both 
procedural and substantive objections to the actions taken by the 
government, or simply asserting claims that compete with those of 
other allegedly innocent owners.  In such cases, the best result, from 
the government’s perspective, is a settlement in which the 
competing claims are amicably resolved among the parties. 
In United States v. One Oil Painting Entitled “Femme en 
Blanc” by Pablo Picasso,149 the government filed a civil forfeiture 
action pursuant to Sections 981(a)(1)(C) and 2314–15, alleging that 
a 1922 Picasso was subject to forfeiture because it had been stolen 
by the Nazis from a Jewish woman in Paris in 1940, and 
subsequently transported to the United States.150  The grandson of 
the victim filed a claim to the painting, asserting that it belonged to 
him as his grandmother’s rightful heir.151  But a woman who had 
purchased the painting in 1976 from an art gallery in New York, 
without having any reason to know that it was stolen, filed a 
competing claim asserting that the painting belonged to her as a 
bona fide purchaser for value.152 
The parties filed private lawsuits against each other, cross-
claims in the forfeiture proceeding, and motions challenging the 
government’s right to take title to the painting under the forfeiture 
laws.153  In the end, with the court declining to grant any of the 
procedural motions that would have given one claimant an 
advantage over the other, the parties entered into a settlement 
whereby the court granted title to the buyer, who in turn agreed to 
 
a7d1-e4efec6389f0_story.html [https://perma.cc/R9NE-5B22]. 
 149 United States v. One Oil Painting Entitled “Femme en Blanc,” 362 F. Supp. 2d 
1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 150 Id. at 1178–79. 
 151 Id. at 1179. 
 152 Id. at 1178–79; Stipulation Attaching Exhibits to Consent Judgment at 9, United 
States v. One Oil Painting Entitled “Femme en Blanc” by Pablo Picasso, No. 2:04-cv-8333 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2005). 
 153 One Oil Painting Entitled “Femme en Blanc,” 362 F. Supp.2d at 1180. 
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pay $6.5 million to the heir.154 
An even more creative settlement was reached to resolve the 
competing claims to a wood-panel painting by a thirteenth century 
Florentine known as “Madonna and Child.”155  In the 1980s, two 
individuals each held a fifty-percent share of the painting, which 
was stored in a safety deposit box at a Swiss bank in Geneva.156  In 
1986, the painting disappeared—according to the heirs of one of the 
co-owners, it was stolen by the other—and was unaccounted for 
until it appeared in a Sotheby’s auction catalogue in 2014, slated for 
auction in New York.157 
The government filed a civil forfeiture action against the 
painting under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), alleging that it was the 
proceeds of a violation of the National Stolen Property Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 2315, because the second co-owner had removed the 
painting from the safety deposit box without the permission of the 
first, and had consigned it to Sotheby’s for sale without giving 
notice to the other.158  Numerous parties filed claims including the 
alleged thief, who moved to dismiss the forfeiture complaint on the 
ground that, because the painting belonged to her, it could not have 
been stolen.159 
The court declined to dismiss the complaint, ruling quite 
correctly that factual issues such as who owned the painting would 
have to be resolved at trial.160  This prompted the parties to enter 
 
 154 See Consent Judgment at 2–4, United States v. One Oil Painting Entitled “Femme 
en Blanc” by Pablo Picasso, No. 2:04-cv-8333 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2005) (government 
relinquishing title and parties agreeing to settle); Claire Selvin, Picasso Painting Once the 
Subject of Nazi-Loot Lawsuit to appear at Zurich Art Weekend, ART NEWS (June 16, 2019), 
https://www.artnews.com/art-news/news/nazi-looted-picasso-hauser-wirth-zurich-
12693/#! [https://perma.cc/YH4B-RVT3] (buyer paying 6.5 million dollars to the heir). 
 155 United States v. The Painting Known and Described as “Madonna and Child,” 
2015 WL 108416, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2015). 
 156 Id. at *1–2. 
 157 Id. at *4–6. 
 158 Id. at *4–5; see also Verified Complaint at 7, United States v. The Painting Known 
and Described as “Madonna and Child,” No. 1:14-cv-4485 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2014) 
(alleging that the painting was the proceeds of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2315 as well as a 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 542, which prohibits the entry of goods into the United States by 
means of false statements). 
 159 The Painting Known and Described as “Madonna and Child,” 2015 WL 108416, 
at *5. 
 160 Id. at *6–7. 
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into settlement negotiations and, in the end, they agreed that the 
painting would be sold and that the proceeds of the sale (minus 
attorneys’ fees and storage expenses) would be divided among the 
claimants.161  One-half was allocated to the heirs of the first co-
owner, and the other half was divided three ways between the other 
co-owner and two individuals who claimed that she had transferred 
her share to them at some point in the past.162 
2. “Portrait of Wally” 
When civil forfeiture cases do not settle, the government has 
little choice but to press forward with the forfeiture action, opposing 
the claims of the third parties who believe the government’s attempt 
to recover the property for the person, entity, or country that the 
government considers to be the rightful owner to be misguided.  
Often this can lead to years of litigation, forcing the government to 
expend considerable resources. 
The best-known example of such protracted and contentious 
litigation involves a painting by the artist Egon Schiele, known as 
“Portrait of Wally.”163  In 1938, the owner of the painting, the Jewish 
owner of an art gallery in Austria, was forced to sell the painting 
along with the rest of her collection to a Nazi Party member on the 
eve of her flight to England to escape the Holocaust.164  When the 
war ended, the painting was recovered by American armed forces, 
and through a complex—and disputed—series of events, was 
ultimately acquired by an Austrian museum.165 
In 1997, the museum loaned the painting to the Museum of 
Modern Art in New York.166  Two years later, in 1999, the 
government seized the painting and filed a civil forfeiture action 
under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c), alleging that it was stolen property that 
 
 161 Stipulation and Order for Settlement at 4, United States v. The Painting Known 
and Described as “Madonna and Child,” No. 1:14-cv-4485 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2015). 
 162 Id. at 4–5. 
 163 United States v. Portrait of Wally (Wally I), 105 F. Supp. 2d 288 (S.D.N.Y. July 
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had been imported into the United States “contrary to law.”167 
The Austrian museum contested the forfeiture and, putting on a 
“full court press,” filed a series of motions that resulted in four 
lengthy district court opinions between 2000 and 2009.168  Among 
other things, the museum contested the court’s jurisdiction to 
litigate the case, alleged that in seizing the painting, the government 
violated its rights under the Due Process Clause, and claimed that 
the delay of over 60 years in bringing the case violated the doctrine 
of laches.169  Moreover, on the merits of the government’s 
complaint, the museum argued that, because it was sold to the Nazi 
Party member and not taken without the owner’s consent, the 
painting had never been stolen; that even if it was stolen originally, 
it was no longer “stolen” within the meaning of the National Stolen 
Property Act when the museum acquired it after it was recovered by 
American armed forces, and that the museum did not know that it 
was stolen when it caused the painting to be imported into the 
United States in 1997.170 
In the end, in ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment by 
the government and the museum, the court held that the painting 
was “stolen” within the meaning of the National Stolen Property 
Act because it was acquired from the owner by a Nazi Party member 
who demanded it from her “at a time when she could not refuse.”171  
And it held that it remained “stolen” at the time it was imported into 
the United States, despite its recovery by American armed forces 
and the owner’s failure to recover it at that time.172  Nevertheless, 
the court held that there was a material issue of fact as to whether 
the museum’s director knew that the painting was stolen at the time 
it was imported into the United States.173  Because such knowledge 
is required to prove that there was a violation of the National Stolen 
 
 167 Id. at 250. See Amended Verified Complaint ⁋⁋ 8–9, Wally I , 105 F. Supp. 2d 288 
(S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2000) (No. 99 Civ. 9940). 
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Property Act, the court could not conclude that the government was 
entitled to the painting under Section 1595a(c) as long as that 
element was in dispute.174  Accordingly, the court denied both 
parties’ motions for summary judgment and set the case for trial.175 
Finally, on the eve of trial, more than ten years after the 
forfeiture action was commenced, the parties settled the matter, with 
the museum agreeing to pay the heirs of the rightful owner $19 
million, and the heirs and the government agreeing to relinquish the 
painting to the museum.176 
3. 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone and the Mask of 
Ka-Nefer-Nefer 
Two other hotly-contested civil forfeiture cases illustrate other 
issues that the government has been forced to litigate when 
attempting to recover and repatriate stolen artwork and antiquities, 
and the pitfalls of the judicial process. 
In United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone 
Sculpture,177 the government filed a civil forfeiture action under 19 
U.S.C. § 1595a(c) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 545 and 981(a)(1)(C) to recover 
a statue that was looted from an archaeological site in Cambodia 
during the war in the 1960s and 1970s.178  The statue was allegedly 
taken in 1972 and purchased by a collector in Thailand, who then 
attempted to sell it on the international market.179  After struggling 
to find a buyer, the Thai collector sold the statue through an auction 
house in the U.K. to a Belgian businessman in 1975, whose widow 
consigned it to Sotheby’s for sale in the United States in 2010.180 
Sotheby’s and the consignor filed claims contesting the 
forfeiture and moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the 
facts alleged in the complaint would not be sufficient to establish 
 
 174 Wally IV, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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the requirements of any of the named forfeiture statutes.181  In 
particular, the claimants asserted that the government could not 
prove the three factors that it was required to prove: (1) that the 
statue was stolen, (2) that it remained stolen at the time it was 
imported, and (3) that the entity that imported it—which was 
Sotheby’s—knew it was stolen at that time.182  The court allowed 
the government to amend its complaint to address these concerns, 
and denied the motion to dismiss.183 
While no one knew the identity of the thief nor the 
circumstances surrounding the removal of the statue from the 
archaeological site, the court held the complaint alleged enough 
facts to show that it was the property of Cambodia and that 
Cambodia had not given permission to anyone to remove it from 
that country.184  Moreover, the court held that under English law, 
Cambodia’s ownership was not extinguished by the intervening sale 
of the statue to the Belgian businessman in the U.K. in 1975.185  
Thus, the complaint properly alleged that the statue was stolen and 
remained stolen when it was imported into the United States.186 
Whether the complaint alleged sufficient facts to support the 
third element was the most difficult issue, as the claimants argued 
that there was no evidence that Sotheby’s knew the statue was stolen 
at the time it imported it.187  The court held, however, that the 
evidence—that Sotheby’s has “particular expertise in works from 
India and Southeast Asia,” that Sotheby’s had consulted with the 
Thai collector before it imported the statue and knew that he had 
had trouble selling it because of insufficient documentation as to its 
origin, that the Thai collector himself knew the statue was stolen, 
and that Sotheby’s “provided inaccurate provenance information” 
in communicating with potential buyers—was sufficient, taken 
together, to withstand the motion to dismiss.188  Thereafter, to avoid 
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further litigation, Sotheby’s and the consignor withdrew their 
claims and agreed to allow the statue to be returned to Cambodia.189 
A case with seemingly similar facts, however, resulted in a very 
different disposition in another court.  In 1973, a 3,000 year-old 
Egyptian mask “went missing” from its storage location in Cairo.190  
Years later, the mask turned up in the St. Louis Art Museum.191  
When the museum refused to return the mask at the request of the 
Egyptian government, the United States filed a civil forfeiture 
action entitled United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer,192 alleging 
that the mask was subject to forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) 
as property imported into the United States “contrary to law,” and 
that it was “stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or 
introduced.”193 
As in the case 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, the 
Museum filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the 
facts set forth by the government were not sufficient to support a 
reasonable belief that the government would be able to establish the 
forfeitability of the property at trial, as required by Supplemental 
Rule G(2)(f).194  The district court agreed with the Museum and 
granted the motion to dismiss.195  It is not sufficient, the court said, 
to allege “that because something went missing from one party in 
1973 and turned up with another party in 1998, it was therefore 
stolen and/or imported or exported illegally.”196 
The government moved to amend its complaint to allege 
additional facts showing that the mask was stolen within the 
 
 189 See United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, No. 1:12-
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meaning of the National Stolen Property Act, but the district court 
denied the motion as untimely, and the government appealed.197 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court on the narrow 
procedural issue, agreeing with the district court that the 
government’s motion to amend was untimely.198  In dicta, however, 
two of the three judges expressed a clear hostility to the merits of 
the government’s forfeiture action.199 
In the majority’s view, the government failed to cite the Stolen 
Property Act in the first instance because it wanted to avoid having 
to prove that whoever imported the mask knew that it was stolen.200  
Such proof, the majority said, is essential to establishing that the 
importation was “contrary to law” as Section 1595a(c) requires.201  
Otherwise, the government could use the forfeiture laws to the 
detriment of museums “and other good faith purchasers in the 
international marketplace for ancient artifacts.”202  “The Executive 
Branch,” the panel added, “should anticipate judicial resistance” to 
the use of the forfeiture laws to take property from “non-culpable 
parties.”203 
In an opinion concurring only on the procedural issue, the third 
member of the panel objected to the majority’s view on this point.204  
The judge argued that the illegal trade in cultural artifacts is a 
serious international issue and the government is, therefore, justified 
in using the forfeiture laws to combat it.205  Importantly, Congress 
exempted the customs laws from the innocent owner defense 
enacted by CAFRA.206  Because “[e]ven innocent owners may have 
to forfeit their property, the judge concluded, “museums and other 
participants in the international market for art and antiquities need 
to exercise caution and care in their dealings in order to protect this 
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heritage and to understand that the United States might ultimately 
be able to recover such purchases.”207 
V. The Innocent Owner Defense 
The judicial reluctance to trespass on the property rights of third 
parties who acquire property without knowing that it is stolen, as 
expressed in the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Mask of Ka-Nefer-
Nefer,208 brings us to the controversy created by the enactment of 
the innocent owner defense to civil forfeitures and its criminal 
forfeiture counterpart.209  We begin the discussion with some brief 
background on the civil forfeiture provision, and then look at how 
it has been applied. 
A. The Innocent Owner Defense: 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) 
Historically, civil forfeiture statutes–some of which date back to 
the eighteenth century–contained no provision exempting innocent 
owners from the consequences of a forfeiture action brought against 
their property.210  Nor was any such protection found to be implicit 
in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.211  To the 
contrary, as the Supreme Court held in Bennis v. Michigan,212 except 
in those cases where Congress had enacted an innocent owner 
defense that applied in a particular situation, property could be 
forfeited based on its use in the commission of an offense whether 
the property owner was aware of the illicit use of her property or 
not.213 
In CAFRA, Congress reacted to the Bennis decision by enacting 
a uniform innocent owner defense that applies to most civil 
forfeiture cases.214  Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983(d), the defense 
 
 207 Id. at 745–46 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
 208 United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, 2012 WL 1094658 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 
2012), aff’d, 752 F.3d 737, 745 (8th Cir. 2014) (Murphy, J., concurring). 
 209 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (2019). 
 210 See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 446 (1996). 
 211 Id. at 448. 
 212 516 U.S. 442 (1996). 
 213 Id. at 446.  See Cassella, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, supra 
note 1, at § 12-56 (explaining the history of the innocent owner defense). 
 214 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. § 2(d) (2d 
Sess. 2000). 
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provides categorically that the interest of an innocent owner “shall 
not be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute.”215 
The statute goes on to define an innocent owner in two ways.  
With respect to a person who had an interest in the property before 
it was involved in the commission of the offense, the defense applies 
to one who “did not know of the conduct giving rise to the 
forfeiture” or who “did all that reasonably could be expected under 
the circumstances” to prevent the illegal use of her property.216  With 
respect to a person who acquired her interest in the property after it 
was involved in the commission of the offense, the defense applies 
to a person who was “a bona fide purchaser . . . for value [who] did 
not know and was reasonably without cause to believe that the 
property was subject to forfeiture” at the time that she acquired it.217 
In the context of cases involving stolen property, the former 
provision protects the rightful owner who never surrendered title to 
her property and did not consent to it being taken from her,218 and 
the latter provision protects someone who purchased the stolen 
property—from the thief or otherwise—in an arm’s-length 
transaction (i.e., for fair market value), without reason to know that 
it was stolen.219 
In enacting CAFRA, however, Congress chose to exempt 
 
 215 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (2019). 
 216 § 983(d)(2). 
 217 § 983(d)(3). 
 218 Cf. United States v. Abdullahi, 2019 WL 3824233 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 14, 2019) 
(noting in a criminal forfeiture case, that the Government recognized that the rightful 
owner of a stolen firearm may recover it even if it was used by another person to commit 
a criminal offense and was forfeited); United States v. Monzon, 2009 WL 361095, at *2 
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2009) (noting that the government recognizes that a robbery victim has 
a pre-existing, superior interest in stolen funds and agrees to amend the order of forfeiture 
to recognize that interest); Bethany Coll. v. United States, 2015 WL 7430798 (N.D. W. 
Va. Nov. 19, 2015) (holding that a victim of embezzlement has the right to notice of 
forfeiture of embezzled funds when they are found in the possession of a third party who 
obtained them from the embezzler). 
 219 See, e.g., United States v. Munson, 477 F. App’x 57, 67–68 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that the BFP requirement comes from commercial law; only persons who acquire 
the property in an arm’s-length transaction can be BFPs); United States v. 10503 Campus 
Way South, 2018 WL 6834355 (D. Or. Dec. 27, 2018) (holding that a transfer of residence 
from brother to sister for $10 was not a purchase; because the purchase must be an arm’s 
length transaction, “love and affection” cannot be considered part of the consideration). 
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certain forfeiture actions from its provisions.220  As the Second 
Circuit explained in Davis, Congress expressly provided in Section 
983(i) that the term “civil forfeiture statute” does not include “the 
Tariff Act of 1930 or any other provision of law codified in title 
19.”221  The forfeiture statute that the government uses most often 
to recover stolen property that was brought into the United States 
after it was stolen—19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)—is part of the Tariff Act 
of 1930 and, hence, is exempt from the application of the innocent 
owner statute.222 
On the other hand, the forfeiture statute that the government 
uses most often to recover stolen property in purely domestic 
cases—18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)—is clearly covered by the 
innocent owner defense,223 which means that both the victim of the 
theft of the property and a bona fide purchaser for value who 
subsequently acquired the property would be protected from a 
forfeiture action.224  The following cases illustrate how these issues 
have played out in post-CAFRA cases. 
B. Cases Applying the Innocent Owner Defense 
1. “The Painting Known as Hannibal” 
The first case does not involve the victim of a theft or competing 
claims, but it nevertheless illustrates how a forfeiture action 
involving a work of art will be resolved when the statute on which 
the forfeiture is based does not contain an innocent owner 
defense.225  
In United States v. The Painting Known as “Hannibal,”226 the 
owner of a modern work by Jean-Michel Basquiat contracted with 
 
 220 United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 221 Id. at 94 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 983(i)(2)(A) (2011)). 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at 88 (“As for the government’s forfeiture claims under 18 U.S.C. § 981, the 
district court found that Davis had established that she was an innocent owner of the 
monotype within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 981(d)(3)(A), and was therefore entitled to 
summary judgment on those claims.  The government has not appealed that ruling.”). 
 224 See id. at 93–96; see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2)–(3). 
 225 Hannibal I, 2010 WL 2102484 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2010), aff’d in part, remanded 
in part sub nom; Hannibal II, 462 F. App’x 93 (2d Cir. 2012), on remand; Hannibal III, 
2013 WL 1890220 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2013). 
 226 Hannibal I, 2010 WL 2102484. 
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a firm to transfer the painting from the Netherlands to New York, 
and to arrange for its sale.227  The firm did so, but as mentioned 
earlier, the invoice accompanying the painting falsely gave its value 
as $100—not the $1 million that the owner paid for the painting 
when he acquired it, and not the $8 million for which it was later 
appraised.228 
The government commenced a civil forfeiture action against the 
painting under Section 1595a(c), alleging that it was introduced into 
the United States “contrary to law” because the false invoice 
constituted a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 542, which prohibits the entry 
of goods into the United States by means of false statements.229  The 
owner opposed the forfeiture, asserting that the allegedly false 
statement on the invoice was not material and that, in any event, he 
was an innocent owner entitled to protection from forfeiture because 
he was not the one who shipped the painting to the United States, 
and because he was unaware that the firm that did ship the painting 
made the false statement on the invoice.230 
The district court held that the false statement as to the value of 
the painting was material because, by stating the value to be less 
than $200, the shipper evaded customs regulations requiring more 
extensive documentation before merchandise can be imported into 
the United States.231  Moreover, the court held that, because there is 
no innocent owner defense to forfeitures brought under the customs 
laws, the owner’s lack of involvement in the shipping process, and 
his lack of knowledge of the shipper’s false statements on the 
invoice accompanying the shipment, were irrelevant and gave him 
no basis to object to the forfeiture.232 
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that 
the false statement regarding the painting’s value was a material 
misrepresentation,233 and that there is no innocent owner defense to 
forfeitures under Section 1595a(c).234  Thus, as the district court 
 
 227 Id. at *1. 
 228 Id. at *1–2. 
 229 Id. at *2–3. 
 230 Id. at *3–4. 
 231 Hannibal I, 2010 WL 2102484, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2010). 
 232 Id. 
 233 Hannibal II, 462 F. App’x 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 234 Id. at 95 (citing United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 92–94 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
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later explained on remand, because the culpability of the owner of 
the property is not a factor in civil forfeiture cases, the false 
statement by the shipper was all that was required to render the 
painting subject to forfeiture under Section 1595a(c).235 
2. “The Painting Known as Le Marche” 
With that background, it will be easy to understand what 
happened when the government filed a civil forfeiture action against 
a stolen painting under two forfeiture statutes—one of which carried 
an innocent owner defense and one of which did not—and a wholly 
innocent third-party buyer who filed a claim.236 
In United States v. The Painting Known as Le Marche,237 the 
government filed a civil forfeiture action against a painting by 
Camille Pissarro that a buyer, Sharyl Davis, purchased for fair 
market value in 1985, unaware that it had recently been stolen from 
a French museum.238  Indeed, Davis had displayed the painting in 
her home for ten years before consigning it to Sotheby’s for sale.239 
When the government became aware of the provenance of the 
painting, it filed a civil forfeiture action to recover it and return it to 
France, but unlike the cases discussed earlier in which the buyer 
voluntarily relinquished her interest in the stolen work or engaged 
in a settlement, Davis “refused to blink,” and forcefully pressed her 
claim to the painting as an innocent owner.240 
The government’s action was based on two theories: (1) that the 
painting was subject to forfeiture under Section 981(a)(1)(C) as the 
proceeds of a violation of the National Stolen Property Act, and (2) 
that it was subject to forfeiture under Section 1595a(c) as stolen 
property introduced into the United States contrary to law.241 
The district court held that Davis was a bona fide purchaser for 
value, which meant that she was an “innocent owner” within the 
 
 235 Hannibal III, 2013 WL 1890220, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2013). 
 236 See United States v. The Painting Known as “Le Marche,” 2010 WL 2229159, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Davis, 648 F.3d at 87. 
 237 Le Marche, 2010 WL 2229159. 
 238 See Davis, 648 F.3d at 86–87 (providing factual background that was not provided 
in the lower court’s opinion). 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. at 87; Le Marche, 2010 WL 2229159, at *1. 
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meaning of Section 983(d)(3), and thus was entitled to prevail 
against the government (and the museum) to the extent that the 
forfeiture action was based on Section 981(a)(1)(C).242  But it held 
that because the innocent owner defense does not apply to Section 
1595a(c), Davis’s status as a bona fide purchaser gave her no 
advantage over the government (or the museum) insofar as the 
forfeiture was based on that statute.243  Rather, to prevail in a 
forfeiture action based on Section 1595a(c), Davis would have to 
contest the forfeiture on the merits and establish that the painting 
was not stolen, that it was not transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce, or that the person who transported it did not know that 
it was stolen at that time.244 
Accordingly, the court granted Davis’s motion for summary 
judgment with respect to the Section 981(a)(1)(C) theory, but 
denied it with respect to Section 1595a(c) and set the case for trial.245  
When a jury returned a unanimous verdict for the government, 
finding that Davis failed to meet her burden of proof, the court 
entered judgment for the government, and Davis appealed.246 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, 
agreeing that there is no innocent owner defense in Section 1595a(c) 
and that one cannot be judicially implied.247  Moreover, it rejected 
Davis’s claim that the forfeiture of property from an innocent owner 
violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment,248 
and denied Davis’s request for attorney’s fees even though she had 
prevailed as to the part of the government forfeiture action that was 
based on Section 981(a)(1)(C).249 
 
 242 United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. The 
Painting Known as “Le Marche,” 2010 WL 2229159, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010). 
 243 Davis, 648 F.3d at 88; Le Marche, 2010 WL 2229159, at *1. 
 244 See Davis, 648 F.3d at 88; see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1595(a)(c), 1615 (2019). 
 245 Davis, 648 F.3d at 88; Le Marche, 2010 WL 2229159, at *1. 
 246 Davis, 648 F.3d at 88; Le Marche, 2010 WL 2229159, at *1. 
 247 United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 94–95 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 248 Id. at 97. 
 249 Davis, 648 F.3d at 98 (denying request for attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 
2465(c) because recovery under that statute is limited to one who “substantially prevails,” 
and a person who prevails as to one issue but ultimately fails to achieve the objective of 
her claim – to recover the property – has not “substantially prevailed”).  See also Kate 
Taylor, Treasured Pissarro Print Turns into Costly Headache, N.Y. TIMES  (June 8, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/arts/design/buyer-of-stolen-pissarro-work-suffers-
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The lesson from this case is clear: a bona fide purchaser for 
value can prevail against the government and the rightful owner of 
stolen property if the government brings its forfeiture action under 
a statute to which the innocent owner defense applies, but she 
cannot prevail if the government brings its action under a statute to 
which the defense does not apply unless she is able to prove that the 
government’s premise—e.g., that the property was the proceeds of 
theft under the National Stolen Property Act—was incorrect.250 
Accordingly, in the interest of protecting the rights of the 
rightful owner of property who was the victim of a theft, the 
government will likely choose to file its civil forfeiture action under 
Section 1595a(c)—or another provision of Title 19—whenever it is 
able to do so, and not under Section 981(a)(1)(C).251  But what 
happens if the forfeiture action is based on a purely domestic 
transaction and Section 981(a)(1)(C) is the only forfeiture statute 
that applies? 
3. United States v. Chowaiki 
Those are the issues that arose in United States v. Chowaiki,252 a 
case involving the innocent owners of a painting that was taken 
from them by fraud, and not one but two possible bona fide 
purchasers who laid claim to the painting in the forfeiture 
proceeding.253  The case, unlike most of those discussed previously, 
was a criminal forfeiture case, but the forfeiture statute and the bona 
fide purchaser defense available to third parties were the same.254 
Ezra Chowaiki owned an art gallery where people would 
consign paintings for sale, with Chowaiki earning a commission if 
the paintings were sold and if the consignor approved the sale and 
the sale price.255  In his criminal case, Chowaiki was convicted of 
defrauding the consignors by using the consigned works as 
collateral for loans to his gallery and by selling their paintings to 
third parties without the consignors’ approval of the terms of the 
 
hefty-loss.html [https://perma.cc/68YK-XBRN]. 
 250 Davis, 648 F.3d at 97. 
 251 Id. 
 252 United States v. Chowaiki, 369 F. Supp. 3d 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 253 See generally id. 
 254 See generally id. 
 255 Id. at 569–70. 
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sale.256  As part of his sentence, he was ordered to forfeit the 
paintings pursuant to Section 981(a)(1)(C) on the ground that they 
constituted the proceeds of the fraud.257 
One of the forfeited paintings was a work by Picasso entitled 
“Le Clown,” which had been consigned to Chowaiki’s gallery by its 
owners.258  The owners made a claim to the painting in the forfeiture 
proceeding, asserting that they had retained title to the painting at 
all times and had never agreed to its sale.259  Indeed, the government 
indicated that it was prepared to recognize the owners’ claim and 
return the painting to them, but two other third parties also filed 
claims, asserting that they had acquired the painting as bona fide 
purchasers for value.260 
One of the claimants was an entity to whom Chowaiki had sold 
the painting without advising the owners or obtaining their 
agreement as to the sale and the sale price, and the other was a lender 
who had loaned money to Chowaiki, taking a secured interest in the 
painting as collateral.261  The facts and legal issues surrounding the 
third-party claims are complex, and their claims appear likely to fail 
on technical grounds,262 but the point is that, in this situation, the 
government and the court were faced with the competing claims of 
 
 256 Id. at 571. 
 257 Id. 
 258 United States v. Chowaiki, 369 F. Supp. 3d 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 259 Id. at 570–71 (noting that four parties filed petitions asserting interests on the 
painting: The Neumans; KS Enterprise LLC; Piedmont Capital LLC; and Albert Togut, 
the Bankruptcy Trustee for the Gallery’s estate). 
 260 Id. In a criminal case, the forfeiture issues are litigated in a post-conviction 
ancillary proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n).  Third parties asserting a bona fide 
purchaser defense may do so pursuant to Section 853(n)(6)(B), which is identical in all 
relevant respects to Section 983(d)(3), its civil forfeiture counterpart).  See Cassella, ASSET 
FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at Ch. 23. 
 261 Chowaiki, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 577 (noting that the lender had asserted a plausible 
claim that it acquired a legal interest in Le Clown as a bona fide purchaser for value). 
Under forfeiture law, a lender who extends a loan and receives a secured interest in 
property in return is considered to be a bona fide purchaser of the property.  Cassella, 
ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at § 23-16(b). 
 262 Chowaiki, 369 F. Supp.3d at 574–77 (noting that the buyer appears to have 
subsequently sold the painting back to Chowaiki and the lender may have obtained its 
secured interest at a time when Chowaiki did not own the painting because he had already 
sold it to the buyer and had not yet bought it back).  For purposes of the discussion, 
however, the outcome of the litigation of the third-party claims is not important. 
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three parties—the owners who consigned the painting but retained 
ownership, the buyer who bought the painting believing that the 
defendant had the authority to sell it, and the lender who took the 
painting as collateral in exchange for a loan—all of whom appeared 
to have a valid claim to the painting under the applicable forfeiture 
statute. 
In a case like Chowaiki, if the government is unable to defeat 
the claims of the putative bona fide purchasers on technical grounds, 
there is the real possibility that one or both of them would be found 
to have a valid claim under the innocent owner statute that trumps—
or is at least on par with—the claim of the actual owner of the 
property and who is seeking its return.263 
4. Resolution: Is there a way out of this? 
When it enacted the bona fide purchaser provision of the 
innocent owner statute, it is unlikely that Congress intended to 
elevate the rights of a thief, or a third party who acquired stolen 
property from a vendor, over the rights of the owner of the property 
from whom it was stolen.264  However, that is a likely outcome when 
the government attempts to use its forfeiture authority to recover 
stolen property for the benefit of the victim, only to have a third-
party purchaser with a plausible claim intervene in a case where the 
innocent owner statute applies.265 
The government can always take the third-party claimant head 
on, as it did in Chowaiki, and attempt to show that he did not give 
fair market value for the property in an arm’s-length transaction,266 
 
 263 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6) (2018) (providing that a person with an interest in the 
property that is superior to the interest of the defendant, such as the victim of a theft, should 
prevail in the ancillary proceeding, but offering no direction as to whether such a person 
has a superior property interest to a bona fide purchaser). 
 264 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(6) (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 853(i)(1) (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 
2461(c) (2017) (statutes allowing the Federal Government to return property seized 
through criminal or civil asset forfeiture to the victim of the theft). 
 265 See United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that had the 
forfeiture action been solely brought under the statute with an innocent owner provision, 
Davis would have prevailed on her claim of the innocent owner defense, even though she 
was only a bona fide purchaser and not the original victim). 
 266 See United States. v. Munson, 477 F. App’x 57, 66 (4th Cir. 2012) (“‘Bona fide 
purchaser for value’ is not defined in CAFRA.  Accordingly, courts often turn to the 
definition in the criminal forfeiture statute, which ‘includes all persons who give 
value . . . in an arm’s length transaction with the expectation that they would receive 
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that he had reason to know the property was subject to forfeiture 
when he acquired it,267 or that there is some technical flaw in the 
third party’s claim.268  But there appears to be no escaping the bona 
fide purchaser defense if all of its requirements are satisfied.269 
In one case involving stolen artwork, the government was able 
to avoid the innocent owner statute by foregoing forfeiture 
altogether.270  In In re Paysage Bords de Seine,271 a painting by 
Auguste Renoir was stolen from the Baltimore Museum of Art in 
1951.272  In 2012, the FBI learned that the painting was being offered 
for sale at an auction in Virginia and took possession of it with a 
seizure warrant to stop the sale.273 
The woman who claimed ownership of the painting, and was 
trying to sell it, asserted that she found the painting at a flea market 
in West Virginia in 2008 or 2009 and purchased it for $7.274  The 
government was skeptical of her claim, taking the view that 
authentic Renoirs seldom turn up in West Virginia flea markets.275  
Rather than commence a forfeiture action in which the “owner” 
 
equivalent value in return.’”). 
 267 See United States v. Chowaiki, 369 F. Supp. 3d 569, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
(explaining that a party asserting a third party claim to a forfeited asset cannot prevail in 
gaining title if they fail to show that they were without cause to believe the property was 
subject to forfeiture at the time of purchase). 
 268 See id. at 573 (“The Government argues that the Trustee lacks a cognizable interest 
in the Work itself.  Rather, according to the Government, the Trustee has at most a 
contractual claim for money damages.”). 
 269 See id. at 571–72 (noting that the government’s interest in the proceeds of a crime 
or fraud vest as soon as those proceeds come into being, and can only be trumped by the 
interest of a bona fide purchaser for value). 
 270 See In re Paysage Bords De Seine, 991 F. Supp. 2d 740, 742 (E.D. Va. 2014) 
(filing an interpleader action to have the court determine who was the rightful owner of 
the painting that was reported stolen in 1951, before being purchased by a bona fide buyer 
in 2008). 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. at 741–42. 
 273 Id. at 742. 
 274 Id. 
 275 See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Baltimore Museum of 
Art’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 7, In re Paysage Bords De Seine, 991 F. 
Supp. 2d 740, 2013 WL 6978215 (“Notwithstanding the ‘Renoir’ plate on the frame of the 
Painting and the paper on the back indicating that it was by Renoir and entitled ‘Paysage 
Borde de Seine,’ Fuqua did not realize that the Painting was an original Renoir at the time 
of her purchase or in the following years.”). 
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might have raised a plausible innocent owner defense, the 
government filed an interpleader action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1335 and Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
invited the museum and the “owner” to file competing claims.276 
Both did so, with the museum putting forth proof of the theft 
and the owner advancing her flea market story.277  In the end, the 
court held that it was unnecessary to determine if the flea market 
story was true because under Virginia law, which governed the 
interpleader, “even a good-faith purchaser for value cannot acquire 
title to stolen goods.”278  Accordingly, it was only necessary for the 
museum to prove that the painting was stolen.279  It did so, and the 
court therefore entered judgment for the museum and dismissed the 
“owner’s” claim.280 
The lesson to be learned from this is that, when state law 
provides that even a bona fide purchaser for value cannot take title 
to stolen property, a proceeding in which state law, not federal 
forfeiture law, governs the outcome could be a better vehicle for 
returning stolen property to its rightful owner.281  But filing an 
interpleader action and letting the opposing parties battle over the 
property with competing claims is hardly an ideal solution.282  In 
doing so, the government foregoes the opportunity to use its 
superior resources for the benefit of crime victims, forcing them to 
retain their own counsel and to litigate their claims—for months or 
years—in what may be a foreign forum.283 
A much better approach would be for Congress to amend the 
bona fide purchaser provisions of both the civil and the criminal 
 
 276 In re Paysage Bords De Seine, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 743. 
 277 Id. at 743–44. 
 278 Id. at 744 (“Longstanding Virginia law provides that one who does not have title 
to goods cannot transfer title to a buyer, even a bona fide purchaser for value without 
notice.”) (citation omitted). 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. at 748. 
 281 See id. at 743–44 (explaining that when Virginia law governs the case, the claimant 
can rebut the bona-fide purchaser claim and to recover their property under a detinue 
action). 
 282 See In re Paysage Bords De Seine, 991 F. Supp. 2d 740, 742 (E.D. Va. 2014) 
(requiring the Baltimore Museum of Art to litigate their claims in the Eastern District of 
Virginia in the interpleader action brought by the federal government). 
 283 See id. 
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forfeiture statutes to eliminate the unintended advantage the statute 
currently gives third-party purchasers over the victims of a theft.284  
Specifically, the statutes could be amended to provide that, in any 
case in which the government has established that the property is 
subject to forfeiture because it was taken from its rightful owner 
without her consent, competing claims between the rightful owner 
and a person who acquired it at some later time must be resolved in 
favor of the rightful owner, even if the subsequent buyer was a bona 
fide purchaser for value without notice that the property was subject 
to forfeiture. 
VI. Conclusion 
The civil and criminal forfeiture laws give the government a 
powerful tool for the recovery of stolen artwork and antiquities for 
the benefit of the rightful owners.  In a great many cases, the process 
works smoothly, with the property being restored to the victim of 
the theft with minimal litigation and cost.285  But an unintended 
consequence of enacting a protection from forfeiture for bona fide 
purchasers for value limits the government’s ability to perform this 
useful service for crime victims in cases in which a third party has 
acquired the property and has the ability to advance a claim that 
trumps that of the rightful owner. 
Amending the federal forfeiture statutes to mirror state laws 
providing that even a bona fide purchaser for value cannot take title 
to stolen property would eliminate this problem, and allow the 
government to make full use of the forfeiture laws to recover 




 284 Generally speaking, the common law does not allow a person to gain title to stolen 
or fraudulently obtained property.  See Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornmisza Collection, 862 
F.3d 951, 960 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Under California law, thieves cannot pass good title to 
anyone, including a good faith purchaser . . . [t]his is also the general rule at common 
law.”) (emphasis added).  It seems unjust, then, to allow a person to gain title over the 
victim of a theft simply because the forfeiture is brought under a statute that allows the 
innocent owner defense in 983(d). 
 285 See supra notes 117–148 and accompanying text (“The Uncontested Cases”). 
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